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Biomedical science and technology often make it possible to know in 
advance whether a child will be born with certain defects or hereditary 
diseases. On the one hand, prenatal tests enable detection of congenital 
diseases, on the other, sometimes, the parents undergo genetic testing 
prior to conception, in order to determine if they are carriers of diseases or 
other deleterious genetic conditions that may show up in their children . 
These techniques bring with them the possibility of their wrong or 
incompetent application: doctors may fail to perform the indicated tests 
which could lead to the discovery of malformations; sometimes the tests 
are made but the outcome is misdiagnosed.  
The consequence is often the birth of an impaired child, which has become 
the object of two different kinds of lawsuits. On the one hand the wrongful 
birth action: the parents sue the laboratory or the physician for his 
negligence; on the other hand the wrongful life action which is brought by 
or on behalf of the disabled child himself, sometimes even against his own 
parents.  
The point is the child would have been aborted or perhaps not even 
conceived if knowledge of his condition had been available. From the legal 
point of view the question is consequently to ascertain whether it is 
possible under present condition to talk about a right to be born helthy, a 
right which seems to be outlined in the words of those courts which 
recognise the so called wrongful life actions .  
The notion of wrongful life derives from a decision of the Appellate Court of 
Illinois, Zepeda v. Zepeda, where a wealthy child sued his father for 
allowing him to be born illegitimate : ìthe plaintiff seeks damages for the 
deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to 
have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal 
ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard'.  
Although the judges considered the behaviour of the plaintiff not only a 
moral wrong but as a tortious act against the individual, and although they 
maintained that the injury is as real as a physical defect, the action is not 
allowed. The recognition of the plaintiff's claim would mean to create a new 
tort, as a consequence, 'encouragement would extend to all others born 
into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might 
seek damages for being born of a certain colour, another because of race; 
one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting 
unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born into a large and 
destitute family, another because a parent has an unsavoury reputation'.  
The following evolution testifies that such a danger was not so far away: in 
1980 the Court of Appeals of Michigan had to decide a case, Grodin v. 
Grodin , where the child sued his own mother because she continued to 
take drugs during pregnancy, not having realised that she was already 
seven or eight months pregnant. As a result of his mother's taking the drug, 
the child had developed teeth that were brown and discoloured.  
According to the court there is no preclusion to exclude the liability of the 
mother: on the contrary, 'a child may maintain a lawsuit against his parent 
for injury suffered as a result of the alleged ordinary negligence of the 
parent except where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of 
reasonable parental authority over the child'.  
So it seems that the tort area is growing bigger: it is starting to cover 
pathologies which have not been the object of actions for damages until 
now. The question is whether these lawsuits are the sign of an evolution 
and change of the concept of state of illness and state of health.  
In most cases, however, the claimed negligence of laboratories, physicians 
or parents resulted in the birth of impaired children. 
In a first group of cases, the physician erred in evaluating the genetic test, 
undergone by the parents prior to conception.  
The German Bundegerichtshof decided an emblematic case in 1983 : the 
parents of a disabled child, prior to the conception of a second one, 
undergo some genetic tests in order to determine if the same disease might 
show up in the unborn. The physician reassures the parents but the child is 
affected by the same disease as the elder sister. The court condemns the 
physician to pay 10.000 DM as moral damage as well as to provide for the 
child's rearing. According to the court, a complete and correct information 
would have prevented the couple from the conception of the child. Their 
aim was not only not to give birth to an impaired child, but also not to be 
exposed to the economic consequences deriving from that birth. As the 
physician had knowledge of it, he had taken full responsibility of avoiding 
such consequences; therefore he has to be considered liable. 
Holding the physician liable for the birth of the impaired child, the 
Bundegerichtshof also discussed whether considering the costs of rearing 
a child as a damage means establishing the equivalence of 'existence of 
the child and damage': their response was negative in contrast with the 
opinion of the BundesVerfassungsGericht, who, in a decision of 1993 
referring to a termination of pregnancy, asserted that 'from a legal point of 
view neither the existence, nor the cost of maintenance of a child may be 
considered as a damage. Otherwise the human dignity as protected by Art. 
1 of the Grundgesetz would have been violated' .  
The liability of the physician or of the laboratories and the consequent 
acknowlegment of the right to get compensation for damage is recognised 
in the United States as well. For example the physician who fails to inform 
the parents that their blood tests revealed that they both were sickle cell 
carriers and that there was a risk of them bearing a child with sickle cell 
disease is condemned to the payment of all expenses "associated with the 
pregnancy" which include medical expenses, pain and suffering, and lost 
wages for a reasonable period, as well as damages for any "emotional 
distress causally resulting from" the wrongful conception.  
In 1993, in England the Court of Appeals , condemned the physician to the 
payment of a great amount of money, because the parents had not been 
informed that a previously aborted child had been impaired. They 
conceived another child who was born suffering from bifid spine.  
In France the Cour de Cassation , in 1996, decided the case of a physician 
who had excluded the possibility of genetic transmission of the neurological 
diseases which affected the husband. The child suffered from the same 
disease as the father: the physician was condemned 'pour réparer les 
conséquences dommageables définitives des troubles de l'enfant'ª with 
respect both of the parents and of the child.  
Analogous is the view of the judges with regard to the second group of 
cases, when the physician, after the child has already been conceived, fails 
to ascertain a disease which may be transmitted to the foetus or does not 
carry out the opportune tests in order to find out genetic disease or 
impairments.  
In these cases it is even more obvious that the only alternative to avoid 
giving birth to an impaired child and consequently, from a legal point of 
view, not being exposed to claims for damages, is the voluntary termination 
of the pregnancy.  
Two decisions may be discussed here: a French and a German one. The 
former was made by Conseil d'Etat in 1997 , the mother, aged 42, 
undergoes an amniocentesis which is negative: nevertheless she gives 
birth to an impaired child. The defect derives from the genetic diseases of 
the child so that, there is no causal connection between the behaviour of 
the laboratories, which made the genetic tests and the disease. 
Nevertheless the negligent conduct of the laboratory caused the parents to 
believe that the child would be healthy and that they could carry the 
pregnancy to term without any danger. The misinformation has prevented 
them from interrupting pregnancy and this has to be considered the 
proximate cause of the prejudice suffered by the parents because of the 
impairment of the child.  
In 1987, the German High Court stated, in order to admit the recovery of 
the damage in favour of the mother of an impaired child, to whom the 
physician had not suggested to undergo some tests during the pregnancy, 
that she should prove that a correct medical information would have 
induced her to undergo an amniocentesis, that from the results of this tests 
it would have been possible to discover the impairment and that as a 
consequence she would have interrupted the pregnancy. As if the right to 
compensation were bound to the proof that the woman would have 
interrupted the pregnancy if severe defects of the unborn had been 
diagnosed.  
The right of the child to sue for prenatal torts and to recover damages for 
being born impaired is even more troublesome : in 1994 for example, the 
Tribunale di Roma, Italy, denied every recovery for damages, on the 
premise that the timely knowledge of the impairments would have had 
relevance only for an interruption of the pregnancy. But a right not to be 
born contrasts completely with the present Italian law system which 
considers life as a supreme and unavailable good. The principle of the 
sacredness of life excludes the case of the child bearing a 'right not to be 
born' . There is no legal right, not to be born.  
The French Courts have decided in a similar way, although on the basis of 
the lack of causation between the disease and the conduct of the physician 
. Last year the Cour de Cassation completely changed this trend and 
recognised to a child who had been born with sever defects, the right to 
recover damages, since the physician had not discovered that the mother 
had contracted German measles .  
In the United States the discussion 'if it is better not be born at all or if it is 
better to be born although with severe defects' is left to philosophy and 
theology.  
Eventually the problem under the legal point of view, is that of the 
individuation of the damage. It consists necessarily in the comparison 
between a defective life and a non life: a healthy life could in no case have 
descended from the conduct of the physician. The impaired child claims to 
be compensated for the damages deriving from a life that he would have 
preferred not to live. Nevertheless, if we are trying, through the recovery, to 
put the injured party in the situation he would have been in, if he had not 
been damaged, we would need to give a value to non-life, to death. 
This may be the reason why in several US States wrongful life actions are 
barred by statutes and in England the Congenital Disabilities Act of 1976 
does not allow that claim any longer .  
In spite of this and in order to overcome the necessary contradictions in the 
solutions offered by the law a careful examination is required which takes 
account of what the different disciplines have contributed so far to such a 
delicate and complicated problem.  
 
 
  
